Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
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Publication:1682726
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.10.010zbMath1414.91131OpenAlexW2765632604MaRDI QIDQ1682726
M. Remzi Sanver, Shin Sato, Bora Erdamar
Publication date: 5 December 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.010
Related Items (3)
An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions ⋮ Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures ⋮ Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
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