Quantal response equilibria for normal form games

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Publication:1896663


DOI10.1006/game.1995.1023zbMath0832.90126WikidataQ55980319 ScholiaQ55980319MaRDI QIDQ1896663

Thomas R. Palfrey, Richard D. McKelvey

Publication date: 5 March 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4510.pdf


91A10: Noncooperative games


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