The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
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Publication:2195085
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.08.008zbMath1446.91018OpenAlexW2063832007WikidataQ52038912 ScholiaQ52038912MaRDI QIDQ2195085
Publication date: 7 September 2020
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.08.008
Related Items (64)
Evolution of generous cooperative norms by cultural group selection ⋮ Aspiration-induced dormancy promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma games ⋮ Evolving cooperation ⋮ Stochastic evolutionary dynamics resolve the traveler's dilemma ⋮ Hidden patterns of reciprocity ⋮ Honesty through repeated interactions ⋮ The conflict of social norms may cause the collapse of cooperation: indirect reciprocity with opposing attitudes towards in-group favoritism ⋮ A model for gossip-mediated evolution of altruism with various types of false information by speakers and assessment by listeners ⋮ Contribution inequality in the spatial public goods game: should the rich contribute more? ⋮ Cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game with delayed decisions ⋮ Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information ⋮ Positive correlation between strategy persistence and teaching ability promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games ⋮ A second-order stability analysis for the continuous model of indirect reciprocity ⋮ Investigating the co-evolution of node reputation and edge-strategy in prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Coveting thy neighbors fitness as a means to resolve social dilemmas ⋮ Does information of how good or bad your neighbors are enhance cooperation in spatial prisoner's games? ⋮ Linkage based on the \textit{kandori} norm successfully sustains cooperation in social dilemmas ⋮ Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory ⋮ Value homophily benefits cooperation but motivates employing incorrect social information ⋮ Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups ⋮ Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas ⋮ Impact of reputation-based switching strategy between punishment and social exclusion on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game ⋮ Active and dormant mechanisms of individual game relationships in evolutionary game theory ⋮ Social dilemma based on reputation and successive behavior ⋮ Complexity of behavioural strategies and cooperation in the optional public goods game ⋮ The influence of confidence in aspiration-fulfillment strategy on prisoner's dilemma evolution ⋮ Impact of keeping silence on spatial reciprocity in spatial games ⋮ The importance of subjectivity in perceptual errors on the emergence of indirect reciprocity ⋮ Effect of memory, intolerance, and second-order reputation on cooperation ⋮ Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation ⋮ Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity ⋮ Using rewards reasonably: the effects of stratified-rewards in public goods game ⋮ A solution for private assessment in indirect reciprocity using solitary observation ⋮ The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity ⋮ Evolutionary game theory meets social science: is there a unifying rule for human cooperation? ⋮ Upstream reciprocity in heterogeneous networks ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with common resource dynamics ⋮ Hybrid assessment scheme based on the stern-judging rule for maintaining cooperation under indirect reciprocity ⋮ A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity ⋮ When does inferring reputation probability countervail temptation in cooperative behaviors for the prisoners' dilemma game? ⋮ Impact of reputation assortment on tag-mediated altruistic behaviors in the spatial lattice ⋮ Effects of defensive cooperation strategy on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma ⋮ Ability-based asymmetrical fitness calculation promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ The rise and fall of cooperation in populations with multiple groups ⋮ The evolution of morals under indirect reciprocity ⋮ Evolution of density-dependent cooperation ⋮ Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity ⋮ Coexistence of fraternity and egoism for spatial social dilemmas ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with trinary reputations ⋮ Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game ⋮ Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: the impact of higher-order history ⋮ Escaping the tragedy of the commons via directed investments ⋮ The evolution of reputation-based cooperation in regular networks ⋮ Chaos, oscillation and the evolution of indirect reciprocity in \(n\)-person games ⋮ The effects of heterogeneity of updating rules on cooperation in spatial network ⋮ Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails ⋮ On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information ⋮ Joint evolution of altruistic cooperation and dispersal in a metapopulation of small local populations ⋮ Best reply player against mixed evolutionarily stable strategy user ⋮ Assortment and reciprocity mechanisms for promotion of cooperation in a model of multilevel selection ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional games and monitoring of interactions between defectors ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
Cites Work
- A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
- How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
- The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
- Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity
- The Evolution of Cooperation
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
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