scientific article

Publication date: 17 April 2002

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

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