Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver

DOI10.3982/ECTA13251zbMath1420.91028MaRDI QIDQ4614989

Tymofiy Mylovanov, Anton Kolotilin, Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Ming Li

Publication date: 1 February 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsinformation disclosureBayesian persuasioninformation designmechanism design without transferspersuasion mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (44)

Persuasion under ambiguity ⋮ Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure ⋮ Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials ⋮ On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals ⋮ Two-sided strategic information transmission ⋮ Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design ⋮ Disclosure in epidemics ⋮ Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling ⋮ Censorship as optimal persuasion ⋮ Persuasion with unknown beliefs ⋮ Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms ⋮ Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents ⋮ Information design for selling search goods and the effect of competition ⋮ Persuasion in Networks: Public Signals and Cores ⋮ Information design through scarcity and social learning ⋮ Shuttle diplomacy ⋮ ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN ⋮ Screening for experiments ⋮ Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests ⋮ Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition ⋮ Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production ⋮ Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues ⋮ Pivotal persuasion ⋮ Efficient demands in a multi-product monopoly ⋮ Testing the sender: when signaling is not enough ⋮ False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad ⋮ Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying ⋮ Learning from like-minded people ⋮ Mixtures of mean-preserving contractions ⋮ Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships ⋮ Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion ⋮ Resisting persuasion ⋮ Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment ⋮ Persuasion with costly precision ⋮ Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver ⋮ Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms ⋮ Computing equilibria of prediction markets via persuasion ⋮ Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality ⋮ Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games ⋮ Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion ⋮ Buyer-optimal extensionproof information ⋮ Impact of private observation in the Bayesian persuasion game ⋮ Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games ⋮ Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion

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