Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing

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Publication:4715545

DOI10.2307/2171924zbMath0861.90015OpenAlexW2007271887MaRDI QIDQ4715545

Mark Armstrong

Publication date: 18 November 1996

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171924




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