The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments

DOI10.3982/ECTA14954zbMath1422.91066OpenAlexW3022796137WikidataQ128485092 ScholiaQ128485092MaRDI QIDQ5225244

Riccardo D. Saulle, Thomas Demuynck, Christian Seel, P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Publication date: 19 July 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14954

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityNash equilibriumgroup formationsocial environments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Matching models (91B68)

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