Informal communication
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Recommendations
Cites work
- A Theory of Credibility
- Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
- Communication between rational agents
- Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games
- Credible proposals in communication games
- Deviations, dynamics, and equilibrium refinements
- Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
- Evolutionary stability in games of communication
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
Cited in
(15)- Signaling games
- EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
- Pathways of persuasion
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
- Value of public information in sender-receiver games
- Professional advice
- A reputation for honesty
- Competition and uncertainty in a paper's news desk
- Screening and signaling in communication
- Strategic inattention in the Sir Philip Sidney Game
- A must lie situation -- avoiding giving negative feedback
- Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources
- Cheap talk with two-sided private information
- Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games
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