A Bayesian model of voting in juries

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0843zbMATH Open1006.91028OpenAlexW2039063610MaRDI QIDQ700076FDOQ700076

César Martinelli, John Duggan

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/1038

zbMATH Keywords

voting rulesCondorce jury theoremresponsive cutoff equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Games in extensive form (91A18) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem

Cited In (34)

• Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition
• The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences
• Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition
• Voting to persuade
• First and second best voting rules in committees
• Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives
• Voting in small committees
• Pandering and electoral competition
• Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting
• A theory of hung juries and informative voting
• Judgment aggregation in search for the truth
• Optimal delay in committees
• Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments
• Voting with public information
• Conservativeness in jury decision-making
• A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood
• Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
• Picking the winners
• Jury theorems with multiple alternatives
• The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition
• The scholarship assignment problem
• Subgroup deliberation and voting
• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• Consistent representative democracy
• Evaluation and strategic manipulation
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Voting on tricky questions
• Full information equivalence in large elections
• Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting
• Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections
• Convergence results for unanimous voting
• Information aggregation with a continuum of types
• Extending the Condorcet jury theorem to a general dependent jury
• Unanimous rules in the laboratory

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