Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2386zbMath0911.90134OpenAlexW1974122467MaRDI QIDQ1270060

Hideo Konishi, Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber

Publication date: 4 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2386

zbMATH Keywords

existence of a noncooperative equilibriumfinite local public goods economyquasi-linear preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (22)

Does endogenous formation of jurisdictions lead to wealth-stratification? ⋮ Endogenous formation of security exchanges ⋮ Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a group formation game with positive externalities ⋮ Formation of segregated and integrated groups ⋮ Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules. ⋮ Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs. ⋮ Power at general equilibrium ⋮ Dynamic club formation with coordination ⋮ Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects. ⋮ Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes ⋮ Efficiency and consistency for locating multiple public facilities ⋮ Market Games and Clubs ⋮ Networks and Stability ⋮ Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules ⋮ ``Almost subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting ⋮ Self-selection consistent functions ⋮ Stability and segregation in group formation ⋮ A testable model of consumption with externalities ⋮ Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative stability ⋮ Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization ⋮ Sorting out single-crossing preferences on networks ⋮ The Tiebout hypothesis under membership property rights

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Competitive equilibrium with local public goods
• Proportional taxation: Nonexistence of stable structures in an economy with a public good
• Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
• Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities
• Second best taxation as a game
• Existence of equilibria in economies with a local public good
• A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
• Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
• Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
• Convergence theorems on the core of a public goods economy: Sufficient conditions
• Non-emptiness of the core: Low multi-dimensional decisions spaces and one-dimensional preferences
• Free mobility equilibrium in a local public goods economy with congestion
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Competition among institutions
• Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods
• Potential games
• Voting with ballots and feet: Existence of equilibrium in a local public good economy
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Constitutional Rules of Exclusion in Jurisdiction Formation
• Increasing Returns to Size and Their Limits
• Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
• The Tiebout Hypothesis: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies
• A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures
• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core
• Clubs and the market: Large finite economies

This page was built for publication: Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy