Sharing a river.
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Publication:1867559
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2949zbMath1033.91503DBLPjournals/jet/AmbecS02OpenAlexW1520343383WikidataQ59663891 ScholiaQ59663891MaRDI QIDQ1867559
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2949
Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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