A unifying impossibility theorem
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Publication:382333
DOI10.1007/s00199-013-0750-6zbMath1284.91141OpenAlexW2089390008MaRDI QIDQ382333
Shino Takayama, Priscilla T. Y. Man
Publication date: 18 November 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0750-6
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