On the operation of multiple matching markets
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Publication:516981
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.001zbMath1394.91299OpenAlexW2529965891MaRDI QIDQ516981
Morimitsu Kurino, Hidekazu Anno
Publication date: 16 March 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_uri&item_id=37400
market designstrategy-proofnessdeferred acceptance rulessecond-best incentive compatibilitytop trading cycles rules
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (6)
Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement ⋮ Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles ⋮ On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts ⋮ Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility ⋮ Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences ⋮ Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
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