In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.
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Publication:899680
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.007zbMath1369.91019DBLPjournals/jet/GarciaV16OpenAlexW2141288980WikidataQ57622197 ScholiaQ57622197MaRDI QIDQ899680
Julián García, Matthijs van Veelen
Publication date: 30 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.007
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (7)
Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Hamilton's rule ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs ⋮ Evolution and the ultimatum game ⋮ Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions ⋮ An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Best reply player against mixed evolutionarily stable strategy user
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