An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90004-XzbMath0825.90836OpenAlexW2077457687MaRDI QIDQ1192634

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90004-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

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