Ternary voting games

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Publication:1365000

DOI10.1007/BF01263275zbMath0880.90144OpenAlexW4213138713MaRDI QIDQ1365000

Moshé Machover, Dan S. Felsenthal

Publication date: 28 August 1997

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01263275




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