Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
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Recommendations
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
- Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making
- Collective Choice May Tell Nothing About Anyone’s Individual Preferences
- Collective choice procedures
- Individually rational collective choice
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5159049
- Collective decision-making by rational agents with differing preferences
- Collective decision making by rational individuals
- Collective choice with endogenous reference outcome
Cites work
- A `threshold aggregation' of three-graded rankings
- A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity
- A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- A simple characterization of approval voting
- A simple characterization of majority rule
- A simple characterization of plurality rule
- A Strategic Analysis of Nonranked Voting Systems
- Acyclic social choice from finite sets
- Algebraic aggregation theory
- An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains
- Another characterization of the majority rule.
- Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
- Between liberalism and democracy.
- Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach
- Characterizing approval voting
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
- Group identification
- Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
- Individual powers and social consent: an axiomatic approach
- Liberal Values and Independence
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation
- On the theory of aggregation
- Ordinal Preference and Rational Choice
- Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
- Procedural group identification
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Simple collective identity functions
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- The Simple Majority Decision Rule
- Voting by Committees
- Voting by committees under constraints
- Voting under constraints
Cited in
(12)- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making
- Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
- Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser
- Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Community standards
- Preferences for harmony and minority voting
- Classifications and inferences of collective preferences
- Dis\&approval voting: a characterization
- Collective Choice May Tell Nothing About Anyone’s Individual Preferences
- Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
- Characterizations of approval ranking
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