Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
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Publication:508390
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.12.006zbMath1400.91377OpenAlexW2566428960MaRDI QIDQ508390
Yuichiro Kamada, Fuhito Kojima
Publication date: 10 February 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.006
Related Items (35)
Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas ⋮ Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment ⋮ Constrained random matching ⋮ Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism ⋮ Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand ⋮ Matching through institutions ⋮ The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints ⋮ Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms ⋮ Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints ⋮ Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation ⋮ Refined computational complexities of hospitals/residents problem with regional caps ⋮ Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching ⋮ On the number of employed in the matching model ⋮ Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves ⋮ Refined computational complexities of hospitals/residents problem with regional caps ⋮ Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems ⋮ Finding all stable matchings with couples ⋮ Assignment Mechanisms Under Distributional Constraints ⋮ Market Design ⋮ Envy-free matchings with lower quotas ⋮ The lattice of envy-free matchings ⋮ Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas ⋮ Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis ⋮ Some further properties of the cumulative offer process ⋮ Partitionable choice functions and stability ⋮ Optimizing reserves in school choice: a dynamic programming approach ⋮ Fair division with two-sided preferences ⋮ Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints ⋮ Stability vs. no justified envy ⋮ Envy-freeness and relaxed stability: hardness and approximation algorithms ⋮ Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach ⋮ Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts ⋮ Dynamic reserves in matching markets
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