The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.004zbMath1252.91012OpenAlexW2170339596MaRDI QIDQ634531

Drew Fudenberg, Yuichi Yamamoto

Publication date: 16 August 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8896226

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic gamefolk theoremimperfect public monitoringreturn-generationself-generation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (20)

A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games ⋮ Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers ⋮ Elementary subpaths in discounted stochastic games ⋮ The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Time-Dependent Discounting ⋮ A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes ⋮ A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model ⋮ Cooperative teaching and learning of actions ⋮ Fully absorbing dynamic compromise ⋮ Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring ⋮ Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game ⋮ Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags ⋮ Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs ⋮ On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games ⋮ Stochastic Games ⋮ Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal ⋮ A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring ⋮ Myopic perception in repeated games ⋮ Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games ⋮ Communicating zero-sum product stochastic games ⋮ Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality

Cites Work

• Learning from private information in noisy repeated games
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Efficiency in Games With Markovian Private Information
• Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown
• Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm forδ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics
• How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?^*
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Asymptotic Theory of Stochastic Games
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Noncooperative Stochastic Games
• Stochastic Games
• Stochastic games

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