On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach

DOI10.1007/BF01770064zbMath0418.90096OpenAlexW2085748302MaRDI QIDQ1131966

Publication date: 1979

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01770064

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley value core bargaining set side payments dynamic solution abstract game models coalition formation: n-person cooperative games individually rational payoffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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