On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach

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Publication:1131966

DOI10.1007/BF01770064zbMath0418.90096OpenAlexW2085748302MaRDI QIDQ1131966

Prakash P. Shenoy

Publication date: 1979

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01770064




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