Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets

DOI10.1007/s00182-005-0002-5zbMath1151.91664MaRDI QIDQ2491082

Manabu Toda

Publication date: 26 May 2006

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0002-5

zbMATH Keywords

Consistency; Maskin monotonicity; Population monotonicity; Two-sided matchings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B68: Matching models

Related Items

Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems, Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets, Consistency and its converse: an introduction, Axiomatization of the core of assignment games, Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems, Impossibilities for roommate problems, An impossibility theorem for matching problems, Social integration in two-sided matching markets, An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm, Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems, Consistency and its converse for roommate markets, Monotonic core allocation paths for assignment games, Matching with restricted trade, Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice, New axioms for deferred acceptance, Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities, Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution, An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems, Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets, Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems, A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings

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