Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets

DOI10.1007/s00182-005-0002-5zbMath1151.91664OpenAlexW2158365491MaRDI QIDQ2491082

Manabu Toda

Publication date: 26 May 2006

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0002-5

zbMATH Keywords

ConsistencyMaskin monotonicityPopulation monotonicityTwo-sided matchings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (21)

Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice ⋮ A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings ⋮ New axioms for deferred acceptance ⋮ Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities ⋮ Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems ⋮ An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems ⋮ Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems ⋮ Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution ⋮ An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems ⋮ Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets ⋮ Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems ⋮ Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets ⋮ Consistency and its converse for roommate markets ⋮ Impossibilities for roommate problems ⋮ An impossibility theorem for matching problems ⋮ Social integration in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Monotonic core allocation paths for assignment games ⋮ Consistency and its converse: an introduction ⋮ Matching with restricted trade ⋮ Axiomatization of the core of assignment games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Consistency and its converse: an introduction
• A weak monotonicity property of the nucleolus
• The central assignment game and the assignment markets
• Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
• Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
• Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
• Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
• Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models
• Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets