House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants
- Non-manipulable house allocation with rent control
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
- House allocation when availability of houses may change unexpectedly
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- House allocation with transfers
- A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties
Cites work
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model
- Consistent house allocation
- Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods
- House allocation with existing tenants
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Kidney Exchange
- On cores and indivisibility
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(38)- Top trading cycles
- Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
- Dorm augmented college assignments
- A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem
- Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
- House allocation when availability of houses may change unexpectedly
- Making just school assignments
- Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
- A note on object allocation under lexicographic preferences
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
- Allocating group housing
- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
- Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
- Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
- House allocation with transfers
- Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
- Incompatibility between stability and consistency
- Influence in private-goods allocation
- Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants
- Endogenous budget constraints in the assignment game
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints
- Matching with restricted trade
- On reachable assignments in cycles
- Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies
- Markovian assignment rules
- On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model
- Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information
- Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf
This page was built for publication: House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q980969)
