Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
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Cites work
- A note on generalized stable sets
- A polynomial-time algorithm to find von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matchings in marriage games
- A property of the core
- A survey on assignment markets
- Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core
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- An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games
- Assignment games with stable core
- Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Convergent Transfer Schemes for N-Person Games
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1194817 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3365082 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the accessibility of core-extensions
- On the accessibility of the core
- On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions.
- On the number of blocks required to access the core
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
- Paths to stability in the assignment problem
- Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries
- Random paths to \(P\)-stability in the roommate problem
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Recontracting Stability
- Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
- Solutions for the stable roommates problem with payments
- Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance
- Stable sets in one-seller assignment games
- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
- Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The central assignment game and the assignment markets
- The coalition structure core is accessible
- The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks
- The core of the matching game
- The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
- The farsighted stable set
- The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
- The myopic stable set for social environments
- The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
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