Decomposing random mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.002zbMath1368.91110OpenAlexW2101358450MaRDI QIDQ898659

Marek Pycia, M. Utku Ünver

Publication date: 18 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.002

zbMATH Keywords

individual rationalitystrategy-proofnesssingle-peaked preferencestotal unimodularityrandom mechanismsuniversal truthfulness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

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