Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games

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Publication:4368668

DOI10.2307/2971739zbMath0890.90184OpenAlexW2067321853MaRDI QIDQ4368668

Elchanan Ben-Porath

Publication date: 16 July 1998

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2971739




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