Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
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Publication:4368668
DOI10.2307/2971739zbMath0890.90184OpenAlexW2067321853MaRDI QIDQ4368668
Publication date: 16 July 1998
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2971739
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Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction ⋮ Dynamic interactive epistemology ⋮ Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning ⋮ Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality ⋮ An epistemic characterization of MACA ⋮ The equivalence of Bayes and causal rationality in games ⋮ Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games ⋮ Competitive centipede games: zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation ⋮ Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs ⋮ Uncertain information structures and backward induction ⋮ Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures ⋮ The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology ⋮ Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games ⋮ Weak belief and permissibility ⋮ An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness ⋮ Non-equilibrium play in centipede games ⋮ Admissibility and common belief. ⋮ An epistemic approach to stochastic games ⋮ Order independence for rationalizability ⋮ Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox ⋮ A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games ⋮ Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games ⋮ Conservative belief and rationality ⋮ Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium ⋮ Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction ⋮ Cycles of learning in the centipede game ⋮ Corrigendum to ``Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior ⋮ Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games ⋮ King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot ⋮ Comprehensive rationalizability ⋮ Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison ⋮ Preference-based belief operators ⋮ Self-admissible sets ⋮ The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games ⋮ On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations ⋮ On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response ⋮ Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games ⋮ Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies ⋮ RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS ⋮ Tremples in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games ⋮ Limited foresight equilibrium ⋮ Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information ⋮ Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction ⋮ Backward induction with players who doubt others' faultlessness ⋮ Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games ⋮ Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning ⋮ ``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game ⋮ A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games ⋮ Strong belief and forward induction reasoning. ⋮ On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
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