Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility

DOI10.1007/s00182-023-00849-0zbMath1530.91128MaRDI QIDQ6183347

Ville Korpela

Publication date: 4 January 2024

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumsocial choice theoryimplementationimpossibility resultscollective decision makingCondorcet rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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