Strongly stable networks
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Cites work
- A dynamic model of network formation
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
- A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers.
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- Stable networks
- Subscription mechanisms for network formation.
- The evolution of social and economic networks.
Cited in
(88)- Endogenous link strength in directed communication networks
- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
- Farsightedly stable networks
- Stable networks
- Structural holes in social networks with exogenous cliques
- Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation
- Existence of share equilibrium in symmetric local public good economies
- An axiomatic characterization of the position value for network situations
- Networks and farsighted stability
- A note on network formation with decay
- Co-authorship model with link strength
- Pairwise stable networks in homogeneous societies with weak link externalities
- Cautious farsighted stability in network formation games with streams of payoffs
- Contagion in networks: stability and efficiency
- Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
- Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities
- Efficiency and stability in a process of teams formation
- Coalition-proof stable networks
- Stability, efficiency, and contentedness of social storage networks
- Shadow links
- Efficiency and stability in a model of wireless communication networks
- Equilibrium refinements for the network formation game
- Stability of networks under horizon-\(K\) farsightedness
- A characterization of farsightedly stable networks
- Coalition formation among farsighted agents
- The formation of networks with transfers among players
- Contractually stable networks
- A one-sided many-to-many matching problem
- Information-sharing in social networks
- The partnered core of a game with side payments
- On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players
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- Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- The stability and efficiency of direct and star networks in a loan game
- Network design in games with spillovers
- Information sharing in oligopoly: sharing groups and core-periphery architectures
- Relationship externalities
- On perfect pairwise stable networks
- Volume of trade and dynamic network formation in two-sided economies
- Network disruption and the common-enemy effect
- Sanctions in networks: ``The most unkindest cut of all
- Network topology, higher orders of stability and efficiency
- Heuristic decision making in network linking
- Network formation games with teams
- Games of Coalition and Network Formation: A Survey
- Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1977289 (Why is no real title available?)
- Stable and efficient coalitional networks
- Modeling financial distress propagation on customer-supplier networks
- Building Social Networks Under Consent: A Survey
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- Networks and stability
- The myopic stable set for social environments
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- On stability of economic networks
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- The computation of pairwise stable networks
- Joint market dominance through exclusionary compatibility
- The calculation and simulation of the price of anarchy for network formation games
- Local farsightedness in network formation
- Market networks: the core
- Clubs and networks
- Computing perfect pairwise stable networks
- Gately values of cooperative games
- Network stability under limited foresight
- Optimism leads to optimality: ambiguity in network formation
- Stable multiplex networks: definitions and characterizations
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- Inequality and network structure
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- Critical agents in networks
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- Measuring agility of networked organizational structures via network entropy and mutual information
- Connectivity, stability and efficiency in a network as an information flow
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