Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.004zbMath1263.91014OpenAlexW3121258188MaRDI QIDQ694739

Claudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou

Publication date: 13 December 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/271298/files/twerp_902.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

implementationsocial choice correspondenceMaskin monotonicitypure and mixed Nash equilibriumset-monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (13)

Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information ⋮ Continuous virtual implementation: complete information ⋮ Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima ⋮ Complexity and repeated implementation ⋮ Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences ⋮ Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility ⋮ Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium ⋮ Bayesian implementation with verifiable information ⋮ A solution to the two-person implementation problem ⋮ Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences ⋮ Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures ⋮ Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions ⋮ Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Rationalizable implementation
• Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
• Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
• A new approach to the implementation problem
• Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms
• A crash course in implementation theory
• Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
• Bayesian Implementation
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

This page was built for publication: Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium