Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.05.011zbMath1142.91343OpenAlexW2154983078MaRDI QIDQ869849

Josef Hofbauer, William H. Sandholm

Publication date: 9 March 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.011

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionevolutionary game theoryconvergence to approximate Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Dynamical systems in optimization and economics (37N40) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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