Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90102-4zbMath0578.90100OpenAlexW1989936306WikidataQ56388115 ScholiaQ56388115MaRDI QIDQ1066823

Michael Maschler, Robert John Aumann

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90102-4

zbMATH Keywords

kernel nucleolus fair allocation bankruptcy problems Talmud divide an estate among creditors pre-kernel coalition proportional division

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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