Bayesian learning in normal form games

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90005-YzbMath0751.90087OpenAlexW2129760941MaRDI QIDQ1192635

James S. Jordan

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90005-y

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriafinite-player finite-strategy normal form gamesmyopic Bayesian learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

Related Items (44)

Belief and truth in hypothesised behaviours ⋮ Bounded rationality and learning. Introduction ⋮ Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games ⋮ Convergence and approximation results for non-cooperative Bayesian games: Learning theorems ⋮ Belief-based equilibrium ⋮ Subjective games and equilibria ⋮ Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term ⋮ Learning and decision costs in experimental constant sum games ⋮ The rate of convergence of continuous fictitious play ⋮ Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm ⋮ Convergence in economic models with Bayesian hierarchies of beliefs ⋮ Social learning in recurring games ⋮ Reputation versus social learning ⋮ Does rational learning lead to Nash equilibrium in finitely repeated games? ⋮ Learning to play limited forecast equilibria ⋮ Limits to rational learning ⋮ Hope springs eternal: Learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games. ⋮ Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium. ⋮ Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games. ⋮ On learning dynamics underlying the evolution of learning rules ⋮ Learning in Games ⋮ The exponential convergence of Bayesian learning in normal form games ⋮ Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games ⋮ Learning a population distribution ⋮ An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions ⋮ Adjustment patterns and equilibrium selection in experimental signaling games ⋮ Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory ⋮ Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games ⋮ On the evolution of optimizing behavior ⋮ An experiment to evaluate Bayesian learning of Nash equilibrium play ⋮ How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures ⋮ Learning in games by random sampling ⋮ Dynamic learning in a two-person experimental game ⋮ Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction ⋮ Mutual observability and the convergence of actions in a multi-person two-armed bandit model ⋮ Repeated implementation ⋮ The possible and the impossible in multi-agent learning ⋮ Learning strategic environments: An experimental study of strategy formation and transfer ⋮ Learning to Coordinate in Social Networks ⋮ Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance ⋮ Boundedly rational quasi-Bayesian learning in coordination games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Rule learning in symmetric normal-form games: Theory and evidence ⋮ Convergence conditions for the Brown-Robinson iterative method for bimatrix games ⋮ Calibration and Bayesian learning.

Cites Work

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• Convergence of least squares learning mechanisms in self-referential linear stochastic models
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• Market Anticipations, Rational Expectations, and Bayesian Analysis
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Controlling a Stochastic Process with Unknown Parameters
• An Example of Convergence to Rational Expectations with Heterogeneous Beliefs

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