Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2853zbMath0996.91015OpenAlexW1978295231MaRDI QIDQ1604516

Michihiro Kandori

Publication date: 4 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2853

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (21)

Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals ⋮ Discontinuous stochastic games ⋮ A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring ⋮ The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games ⋮ Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information ⋮ What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs ⋮ Finitely repeated games with monitoring options ⋮ Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games ⋮ When (not) to publicize inspection results ⋮ Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting ⋮ Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence ⋮ Hybrid assessment scheme based on the stern-judging rule for maintaining cooperation under indirect reciprocity ⋮ Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals ⋮ Instability of belief-free equilibria ⋮ Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games ⋮ Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games ⋮ Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring ⋮ A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games ⋮ A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games

Cites Work

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