Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0097-ZzbMath1180.91024OpenAlexW1963564326MaRDI QIDQ2431839

Hideo Konishi, M. Utku Ünver

Publication date: 24 October 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/wp515.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (20)

Incentives in landing slot problems ⋮ Enrollment manipulations in school choice ⋮ Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket ⋮ Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited ⋮ The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets ⋮ When preference misreporting is harm[lessful?] ⋮ Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods ⋮ Application fee manipulations in matching markets ⋮ Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems ⋮ Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets ⋮ Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets ⋮ The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach ⋮ Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria ⋮ A further note on the college admission game ⋮ Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching ⋮ Optimal truncation in matching markets ⋮ The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences ⋮ On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems ⋮ Manipulation via capacities revisited ⋮ When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
• Queue allocation of indivisible goods
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
• Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
• A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
• Implementation of college admission rules
• Games of manipulation in marriage problems
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
• Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• The College Admissions Problem Revisited
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Manipulation via Endowments
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets