Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5547873 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6297730 (Why is no real title available?)
- An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
- Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
- Competitive auctions
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
- Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
- Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
- Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
- Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
- Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
Cited in
(60)- Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets
- Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions
- Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
- Envy-free revenue approximation for asymmetric buyers with budgets
- A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer
- Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
- Revenue maximizing envy-free pricing in matching markets with budgets
- Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions
- On fair price discrimination in multi-unit markets
- Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
- Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods
- Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
- Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization
- A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
- Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments
- Private Capacities in Mechanism Design
- Autocratic mechanisms: a form of dictatorship in constrained combinatorial auctions
- Bidding strategies for fantasy-sports auctions
- Polyhedral clinching auctions for two-sided markets
- Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities
- Multi-unit supply-monotone auctions with Bayesian valuations
- Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
- On envy-free revenue approximation for combinatorial buyers with budgets
- Clinching auctions with online supply
- Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders
- Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity
- A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets
- Optimal design for multi-item auctions: a robust optimization approach
- Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms -- two players case
- The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6297730 (Why is no real title available?)
- Multi-unit Auctions with Budgets and Non-uniform Valuations
- Unconditional competitive auctions with copy and budget constraints
- Truthful unit-demand auctions with budgets revisited
- Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction
- On social envy-freeness in multi-unit markets
- Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
- Improved Multi-unit Auction Clearing Algorithms with Interval (Multiple-Choice) Knapsack Problems
- Clinching auctions with online supply
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7204414 (Why is no real title available?)
- A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls
- Repeated budgeted second price ad auction
- Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers
- Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions
- Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space
- Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods
- Online random sampling for budgeted settings
- Directional monotone comparative statics
- Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions
- Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder
- Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
- Endogenous budget constraints
- Dictatorial mechanisms in constrained combinatorial auctions
- A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
- Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets
- Auction design for value maximizers with budget and return-on-spend constraints
- Polyhedral clinching auctions for indivisible goods
- Maximize liquid welfare in combinatorial auctions with monotone valuations
- Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models
- A note on the impossibility of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
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