On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
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Publication:839623
DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0358-0zbMath1190.91054OpenAlexW2113215903MaRDI QIDQ839623
Vera Zaporozhets, Michel Le Breton
Publication date: 2 September 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/1786/1/strategy_proofness.pdf
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