A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.07.003zbMath1271.91084OpenAlexW3121541235MaRDI QIDQ2371150

M. Bumin Yenmez, Federico Echenique

Publication date: 29 June 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-153108432

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycorecoalition formationtwo-sided matchingcollege admission problemsimple matchings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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