Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
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Publication:2466857
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.04.001zbMath1150.91008OpenAlexW2038213335MaRDI QIDQ2466857
Hongbin Cai, Joseph Tao-yi Wang
Publication date: 16 January 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/189520
Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)
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Uses Software
Cites Work
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