Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.11.002MaRDI QIDQ665457zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Antonio Miralles

Publication date 5 March 2012

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

allocationprivate informationnontransfer mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910821

Cites work

• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
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• Inefficiencies on linking decisions
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• Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. II: Positional voting
• Microeconomic theory
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies
• Storable votes
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions

Cited in

(25)

• Selecting a winner with external referees
• Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
• Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
• Non-Symmetric Cardinal Value Allocations
• What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals
• Ordinal allocation
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
• Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers
• Efficient allocation of a ``prize --- King Solomon's dilemma
• Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities
• Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
• Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
• Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
• Relative entropy and envy-free allocation
• Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
• Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
• Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers: the role of random priorities
• Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
• The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
• Optimal allocation without transfer payments
• Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers
• Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
• Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach

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