Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
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Cites work
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
- An optimal auction for complements
- Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
- Coordination in auctions with entry
- Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
- Incentives in Teams
- Inefficiencies on linking decisions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. II: Positional voting
- Microeconomic theory
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
- Simultaneous auctions with synergies
- Storable votes
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions
Cited in
(26)- Efficient allocation of a ``prize --- King Solomon's dilemma
- The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
- Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers: the role of random priorities
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
- Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
- Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
- Relative entropy and envy-free allocation
- Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers
- Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
- Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities
- Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- Non-Symmetric Cardinal Value Allocations
- Optimal allocation without transfer payments
- What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910821 (Why is no real title available?)
- Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
- Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
- Selecting a winner with external referees
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
- Ordinal allocation
- Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers
- Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
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