Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90126-9zbMath0673.90102OpenAlexW2036870450MaRDI QIDQ1121185

Steven A. Matthews, Andrew Postlewaite

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/744.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingtradingallocation rulesunmediated communicationequilibrium outcomestwo-person double auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (34)

Deliberative voting ⋮ Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types ⋮ Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects ⋮ Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden ⋮ How naiveté improves efficiency in trading with preplay communication ⋮ Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals ⋮ Communication in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information ⋮ Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium ⋮ Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information ⋮ Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests ⋮ On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality ⋮ Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism ⋮ Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. ⋮ Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information. ⋮ The role of commitment in bilateral trade ⋮ Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication ⋮ Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values ⋮ Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information ⋮ A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information ⋮ Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes ⋮ How communication improves efficiency in bargaining games ⋮ Bilateral trading with naive traders ⋮ The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication ⋮ Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case ⋮ Strategic information transmission with sender's approval ⋮ Optimal sales mechanism with outside options ⋮ Cheap talk can matter in bargaining ⋮ Cheap talk in games with incomplete information. ⋮ Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets ⋮ Coordination in auctions with entry ⋮ A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information ⋮ Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade ⋮ Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Efficient performance in two agent bargaining
• Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
• Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
• The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Non-cooperative games
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Universal Mechanisms
• Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune

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