Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00124-8zbMath1059.91008OpenAlexW3123052421MaRDI QIDQ1421900

Dino Gerardi

Publication date: 3 February 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00124-8

zbMATH Keywords

Revelation principleSequential equilibriumCommunication equilibriumCorrelated equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Games in extensive form (91A18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (32)

A simple model of secure public communication ⋮ Deliberative voting ⋮ Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication ⋮ Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited ⋮ Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players ⋮ Belief-invariant and quantum equilibria in games of incomplete information ⋮ Mechanism design and communication networks ⋮ Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals ⋮ Communication in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information ⋮ Perfect implementation ⋮ A detail-free mediator ⋮ Secure message transmission on directed networks ⋮ A folk theorem for competing mechanisms ⋮ Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games ⋮ Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information ⋮ Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games ⋮ Incentives and the structure of communication ⋮ Long persuasion games ⋮ Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types ⋮ A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions ⋮ Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games ⋮ Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol ⋮ Mediation, arbitration and negotiation ⋮ Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information ⋮ Communication on networks and strong reliability ⋮ Communication games, sequential equilibrium, and mediators ⋮ Interacting mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems ⋮ ``Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies: back to the roots ⋮ Cheap talk in games with incomplete information. ⋮ Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types

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• Mediated talk
• Perfect correlated equilibria
• Universal Mechanisms
• Multistage Games with Communication
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Sequential Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
• Long Cheap Talk
• Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games

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