Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.11.001zbMath1285.91038OpenAlexW1987995371MaRDI QIDQ2447058

Andrew McLennan, Juan Carlos Carbajal, Rabee Tourky

Publication date: 23 April 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/abstract/459.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Roberts' theoremdomain restrictionslexicographic affine maximizationmonotonicity in differencestruthful implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (14)

A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights ⋮ Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences ⋮ Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences ⋮ Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach ⋮ Ordinal allocation ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations ⋮ A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions ⋮ Incentive compatible market design with applications ⋮ Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization ⋮ Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers ⋮ Expressive efficiency of two kinds of specific CP-nets ⋮ Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts ⋮ Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers ⋮ Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments

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