An analysis of the German university admissions system
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Publication:361830
DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0704-4zbMath1278.91108OpenAlexW2072823362MaRDI QIDQ361830
Publication date: 19 August 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74644
strategyproofnesscomplex constraintsGerman admissions systemmatching, stabilityuniversity admissions
Related Items (32)
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