Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice

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Publication:3362076

DOI10.2307/2938172zbMath0734.90026OpenAlexW1993562044MaRDI QIDQ3362076

David Gale, Gabrielle Demange, Ahmet U. Alkan

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e0aceb3cdd4c32acd1fadbbda973ecc5e7c65537




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