Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
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Publication:4895053
DOI10.2307/2171851zbMath0862.90142OpenAlexW3123910378MaRDI QIDQ4895053
James Bergin, Barton L. Lipman
Publication date: 8 January 1997
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171851
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