School Choice with Consent*
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3162725
DOI10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1297zbMath1197.91153MaRDI QIDQ3162725
Publication date: 21 October 2010
Published in: Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1297
Related Items
On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences, Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings, Market Design, When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?, New axioms for top trading cycles, Distance on matchings: An axiomatic approach, CATCHMENT AREAS, STRATIFICATION, AND ACCESS TO BETTER SCHOOLS, School choice with transferable student characteristics, Stability of an allocation of objects, A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism, The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice, Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems, Reallocation with priorities, Responsive affirmative action in school choice, An alternative characterization of top trading cycles, Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods, Strategy-proof stochastic assignment, School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds, A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea, On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm, Two simple variations of top trading cycles, On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts, On the operation of multiple matching markets, Sticky matching in school choice, Influence in private-goods allocation, Decentralized college admissions under single application, Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets, Finding all stable matchings with couples, Efficient assignment respecting priorities, Towards a fair distribution mechanism for asylum, Incompatibility between stability and consistency, Epsilon-stability in school choice, Fair student placement, A marriage matching mechanism menagerie, Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets, A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem, Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution, Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule, Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation, School choice with vouchers, Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas, On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems, Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice, Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets, School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution, Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm, Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities, School choice with hybrid schedules, Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice, Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab, Gradual college admission, Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice, When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?, Matching through institutions, What you don't know can help you in school assignment, Essentially stable matchings, Manipulability in school choice, Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility, Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: improving student welfare in Chicago, Obvious manipulations, On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice, Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications, Corrigendum to: ``Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution, Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure, Two-sided matching with indifferences, Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences, What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets, The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach, The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain, Making just school assignments, The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints, The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism, Strategy-proof allocation with outside option
