Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
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Publication:4138424
DOI10.2307/1912672zbMath0363.90015OpenAlexW3126081580MaRDI QIDQ4138424
Theodore Groves, John O. Ledyard
Publication date: 1977
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/144.pdf
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