Nash implementation without no-veto power
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Recommendations
Cites work
- A crash course in implementation theory
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- Exact implementation
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Implementation and Renegotiation
- Implementation of college admission rules
- Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
- Non-cooperative implementation of the core
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Voluntary implementation
Cited in
(37)- Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
- Repeated Nash implementation
- Implementation with evidence
- Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
- Nash implementation in pure public good economies
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
- Implementation of voting operators
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms
- Rationalizable implementation
- Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
- Time and Nash implementation
- Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability
- Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
- Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
- Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
- Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
- Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
- Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
- On the implementation of the median
- Procedurally fair implementation under complete information
- An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Ex post implementation
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