Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
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Publication:2638977
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90155-WzbMath0717.90108OpenAlexW1989446481MaRDI QIDQ2638977
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90155-w
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Cites Work
- Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
- Multistage Games with Communication
- Sequential Equilibria
- Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
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