Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5564028
DOI10.1287/MNSC.14.7.486zbMath0177.48501OpenAlexW2044155094MaRDI QIDQ5564028
Publication date: 1968
Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.14.7.486
Related Items (only showing first 100 items - show all)
AGENT CONNECTEDNESS AND BACKWARD INDUCTION ⋮ THE PEDESTRIAN PRINCIPLE FOR DIFFERENTIAL GAMES ⋮ Almost common priors ⋮ Network routing for insurgency: An adversarial risk analysis framework ⋮ Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium ⋮ Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria ⋮ Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty ⋮ Uncertain information structures and backward induction ⋮ Games with Symmetric Incomplete Information and Asymmetric Computational Resources ⋮ A Rough View on Incomplete Information in Games ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Data envelopment analysis approaches for two-level production and distribution planning problems ⋮ Nonlocal correlations and noise in different settings of a two-player game ⋮ Perfect regular equilibrium ⋮ Modeling, analysis, and dynamics of Bayesian games via matrix-based method ⋮ An epistemic approach to stochastic games ⋮ The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces ⋮ Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Conjectures and underpricing in repeated mass disputes with heterogeneous plaintiffs ⋮ Coordinated replenishment game and learning under time dependency and uncertainty of the parameters ⋮ Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design ⋮ Agreeing to Disagree ⋮ Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium ⋮ Computational Efficiency in Multivariate Adversarial Risk Analysis Models ⋮ On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in games with private information: a complete characterization ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ One-sided adaptation for infinite-horizon linear quadraticN-person non-zero-sum dynamic games and sensitivity analysis ⋮ Static Games ⋮ Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information ⋮ Repeated Games with Incomplete Information ⋮ FROM CLASSICAL TO EPISTEMIC GAME THEORY ⋮ UNIVERSALLY RATIONAL BELIEF HIERARCHIES ⋮ ON THE COMPLETENESS OF THE UNIVERSAL KNOWLEDGE–BELIEF SPACE: A TECHNICAL NOTE ⋮ Countable spaces and common priors ⋮ Universal knowledge-belief structures ⋮ The information operation in a repeated n-person nonzero-sum game ⋮ The coming of game theory ⋮ The non-existence of a universal topological type space ⋮ Belief-independence and (robust) strategy-proofness ⋮ Periodic strategies. II: Generalizations and extensions ⋮ List of Publications: John C. Harsanyi, December 1997 ⋮ Conditional Probability Logic over Conditional Probability Spaces ⋮ The return function: a new computable perspective on Bayesian-Nash equilibria ⋮ Inequality and Procedural Justice in Social Dilemmas ⋮ Environmental game modeling with uncertainties ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Risk management in hierarchical games with random factors ⋮ Adversarial risk analysis: Borel games ⋮ Ambiguous language and common priors ⋮ A parametric family of two ranked objects auctions: equilibria and associated risk ⋮ The value of information in a simple duopoly model ⋮ Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge ⋮ Implementation in differential information economies ⋮ Belief and truth in hypothesised behaviours ⋮ Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources ⋮ Optimal research for Cournot oligopolists ⋮ Infrastructure security games ⋮ Distributed algorithms for the computation of noncooperative equilibria ⋮ Who wants to break the hockey-stick sales pattern in the supply chain? ⋮ A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information ⋮ An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives ⋮ Games with incomplete information when players are partially aware of others' signals ⋮ Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games under ambiguity ⋮ Autonomous agents modelling other agents: a comprehensive survey and open problems ⋮ Bayesian learning and convergence to rational expectations ⋮ Common knowledge with probability 1 ⋮ Bayesian Nash equilibria using extended Werner-like states ⋮ Reputation in repeated second-price auctions ⋮ Psychology of game playing: introduction to a special issue ⋮ The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games ⋮ Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types ⋮ The work of John F. Nash Jr. in game theory. Nobel seminar, 8 December 1994 ⋮ An early paper on the refinement of Nash equilibrium ⋮ Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information ⋮ Static game theory models and their applications in management science ⋮ Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency ⋮ The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms ⋮ A robust optimization approach for solving two-person games under interval uncertainty ⋮ Near-Nash equilibrium strategies for LQ differential games with inaccurate state information ⋮ Optimal allocation of MRI scan capacity among competing hospital departments ⋮ Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs ⋮ Agency equilibrium ⋮ Robust games: theory and application to a Cournot duopoly model ⋮ Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication ⋮ Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity ⋮ Irregular gaming areas ⋮ Three-player conflicting interest games and nonlocality ⋮ Coalitional game with fuzzy payoffs and credibilistic core ⋮ The \textit{ex ante} \(\alpha\)-core for normal form games with uncertainty ⋮ A model of electoral competition with incomplete information ⋮ Coherent behavior in noncooperative games ⋮ Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example ⋮ Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems ⋮ Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs ⋮ Semidefinite complementarity reformulation for robust Nash equilibrium problems with Euclidean uncertainty sets ⋮ Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence ⋮ Reputation and imperfect information ⋮ Coherent beliefs are not always types. ⋮ Modelling incomplete information in Boolean games using possibilistic logic ⋮ Dynamic pricing of call rates: Bayesian approach
This page was built for publication: Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
