Bayesian Implementation
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Publication:3971630
DOI10.2307/2938265zbMath0735.90002OpenAlexW4242867364MaRDI QIDQ3971630
Publication date: 25 June 1992
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938265
Related Items (70)
Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge ⋮ Coalition-proof full efficient implementation ⋮ Perfect Bayesian implementation ⋮ On the robustness of Laissez-Faire ⋮ Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms ⋮ Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types ⋮ PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES ⋮ Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation ⋮ A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction ⋮ On the implementation of the median ⋮ Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models ⋮ Price suppression stimulation in a local market ⋮ Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu ⋮ Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation ⋮ Robust dynamic implementation ⋮ Minimum cost connection networks: truth-telling and implementation ⋮ Behavioral implementation under incomplete information ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies ⋮ Information in Tullock contests ⋮ Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments ⋮ Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge ⋮ Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information ⋮ Robust implementation in general mechanisms ⋮ Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Quantum Bayesian implementation ⋮ Implementation with partial provability ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ Ex post implementation ⋮ Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication ⋮ Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability ⋮ Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information ⋮ Ambiguous implementation: the partition model ⋮ Role of honesty in full implementation ⋮ Implementation under ambiguity ⋮ A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems ⋮ The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests ⋮ Bayesian implementation with verifiable information ⋮ Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium ⋮ Rationalizable implementation ⋮ Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems ⋮ Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments ⋮ Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information ⋮ A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation ⋮ Implementation with evidence ⋮ Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals ⋮ Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Implementation with extensive form games: one round of signaling is not enough ⋮ Unique implementation of the full surplus extraction outcome in auctions with correlated types ⋮ Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets ⋮ Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments ⋮ Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions ⋮ Weak implementation ⋮ Repeated implementation ⋮ Two-agent interactive implementation ⋮ Bank runs with many small banks and mutual guarantees at the terminal stage ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation ⋮ Common-value group contests with asymmetric information ⋮ Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core ⋮ Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games ⋮ Interactive implementation ⋮ A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation ⋮ Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs ⋮ Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection ⋮ Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information ⋮ Information advantage in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
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